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1101 
THE PRACTICAL MANDATES OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: A BEHAVIORAL ARGUMENT 
FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND 
WARRANT PREFERENCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment1 stands as the main protector of individual 
privacy from government intrusion.2 This protection is prophylactic, as 
“[t]he Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful 
police action.”3 Consequently, the specific protections of the amendment 
aim to deter violations from occurring in the first place. Yet there are two 
troubling trends in Fourth Amendment doctrine that threaten to undermine 
this protection: first, the weakening of the warrant preference,4 and 
second, the growing disfavor of the exclusionary rule.5  
As to the first trend, the Supreme Court formerly interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment rather strictly, requiring searches be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant. More recently, however, the Court has turned to analyzing 
searches under a more amorphous standard of reasonableness. That is, the 
 
 
 1. The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of [the] 
Amendment, as recognized by countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”). 
 3. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969). 
 4. The term “warrant preference” is sometimes used confusingly in the criminal procedure 
literature. Some use it to mean the Supreme Court’s traditional favoring of searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant; others use it to refer to the Court analyzing searches under a broader 
reasonableness standard where the presence of a warrant is a persuasive consideration. For those that 
use the warrant preference to refer to the broader reasonableness standard, the Court’s traditional 
favoring of searches conducted pursuant to a warrant is called the “warrant requirement.” See, e.g., 1 
JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 167–68 (4th ed. 
2006) (describing the traditional “warrant requirement” but also noting that it may “more accurately” 
be called the “warrant preference”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 559 (1999) (describing the Court’s traditional “warrant-preference”). 
Throughout this Note, the term “warrant preference” should be taken to mean the Supreme Court’s 
traditional favoring of searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.  
 5. As discussed further below, the exclusionary rule is the traditional remedy for a Fourth 
Amendment violation in a criminal proceeding, whereby the prosecution cannot use any incriminating 
evidence obtained due to a violation of the amendment against the criminal defendant. 
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legality of a search no longer turns on the presence or absence of a warrant 
(subject to limited exceptions), but on whether the search is reasonable. 
With warrants no longer a per se requirement, more searches can be 
conducted without a warrant and thus without a judge determining the 
legality of the search before it occurs. Instead, legality can be determined 
ex post.  
As to the exclusionary rule, debate over its effectiveness has persisted 
almost since its inception.6 Commentators have maligned exclusion as a 
“crude” deterrent7 and offered some alternative remedies that they believe 
could better deter Fourth Amendment violations. Clearly, criticism of the 
exclusionary rule is not a novel trend. However, members of the Court 
have recently echoed these criticisms and rendered the future of the 
exclusionary rule unclear. 
In this Note, I argue that these trends in Fourth Amendment doctrine 
are based on certain questionable assumptions about human behavior. In 
the movement toward ex post reasonableness review of police conduct 
instead of an ex ante warrant preference, the Court displays a confidence 
in the ability of judges to place themselves in the context of an ex ante 
determination when analyzing a search ex post. Thus, the Court implies 
that judges are able to ignore potentially illuminating yet impermissible 
information that may have been uncovered in the search. And the criticism 
of the exclusionary rule posits that improved deterrence of police 
misconduct requires tying the punishment for an illegal search directly to 
its harm and imposing a more direct sanction. As shown below, both of 
these positions assume that the actors involved behave rationally.8 
These two trends would be apt, and perhaps even compelling, if the 
rationality assumption accurately reflected human judgment and decision 
making. Yet behavioral science, particularly in the fields of cognitive 
psychology and behavioral economics, has identified a number of ways in 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (“The exclusionary rule has for 
decades been the subject of ardent controversy.”); Thomas E. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence 
Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 11, 22–24 (1925) 
(arguing, in 1925, the superiority of the exclusionary rule over other remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations, including tort damages). For a concise overview of the debate over the deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule, see DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4, at 375–79. 
 7. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 56 
[hereinafter Posner, Rethinking]. 
 8. While much of the rationality assumption is implicit, a few pieces offer more obvious 
assumptions of human behavior in exclusionary criticism. See Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of 
Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2000); Richard A. Posner, Excessive 
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1982) [hereinafter 
Posner, Excessive Sanctions]; Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7. 
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which people systematically deviate from rational behavior. When the 
insights of these fields are incorporated into the Fourth Amendment 
analysis, arguments for a looser warrant preference and against exclusion 
are rendered questionable. Quite to the contrary, an analysis informed by 
behavioral science indicates that a combination of warrants and exclusion 
might be important to protecting privacy. 
This Note injects these behavioral insights into the Fourth Amendment 
debate.9 Part II provides a background on Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine, highlighting the current movements away from the warrant 
preference and the exclusionary rule. Part II also draws out the implicit 
behavioral assumptions on which these two trends are premised and 
reveals the basis of these behavioral assumptions in economics. 
Part III begins with the emerging behavioral criticism of economic 
conceptions of human behavior. It shows that the insights of behavioral 
science directly challenge the assumptions central to the current evolution 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine. When analyzed in the light of behavioral 
science, the movements away from the warrant preference and 
exclusionary rule likely lessen the Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
privacy. 
Part IV shows that opposite trends might actually provide better 
protection from illegal searches. That is, requiring judges to determine the 
legality of a search in an ex ante warrant proceeding might result in more 
accurate determinations of legality. And exclusion, instead of being a 
crude tool which fails to deter police misconduct while imposing 
unnecessary costs on society, might actually be a particularly effective 
remedy. Part IV thus demonstrates that we should proceed much more 
cautiously in Fourth Amendment doctrine and question the underlying 
assumptions under which we proceed. 
II. THE STATE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The language of the Fourth Amendment is simple on its face: it 
prohibits unreasonable searches and requires that all warrants be supported 
 
 
 9. In their article A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler briefly mention that the behavioral concept of hindsight bias could 
change the analysis of damage suits for illegal searches. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1533 (1998). 
That discussion was the impetus for this Note. 
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by probable cause.10 Yet these seemingly simple provisions provide little 
guidance for concrete application,11 resulting in protections that are the 
source of staggering controversy.12 The Supreme Court has wrestled 
repeatedly with the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and the Court’s 
various approaches have met with persistent scholarly dissatisfaction.13 
Anthony Amsterdam notes that the decisions of the Court have “no 
considered or consistent indication of the approach to be taken” to 
determine the coverage of the amendment.14 As he bluntly puts it, it is an 
understatement to call Fourth Amendment doctrine a “mess.”15 
This is not to say that Fourth Amendment doctrine is in a state of 
chaos. In applying the Fourth Amendment, a court conducts a three-step 
analysis. First, a court must determine whether the government conduct 
 
 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 11. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
353–54 (1974) (noting that “the fourth amendment is not clear” and calling it a “brief, vague, general, 
unilluminating text”). 
 12. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the courts have 
been “called upon to meet the seemingly unceasing challenge of marking the dimensions of the 
protections flowing from the Fourth Amendment”). See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 
& n.15 (1976) (noting that “[t]he debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a 
warm one” and that seven major opinions of the Court on the rule have “produced a combined total of 
27 separate signed opinions or statements”). Janis produced an additional three opinions. See id. at 434 
(majority opinion); id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 13. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: 
Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998) (“The 
commentators are remarkably unanimous: The Supreme Court cases construing the Fourth 
Amendment are a mess that lacks coherence and predictability, and fails to communicate the contours 
of the field.”) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
759–61 (1994); Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 349–52; Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into 
the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 399 (1994); Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme 
Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1991); Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 473, 474–75 (1991); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1468–70 (1985); Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1268–69 (1991); Morgan Cloud, 
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200–02 
(1993); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down 
That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (1996); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201–02 (1993); Brian J. Serr, Great 
Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 
(1989); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 
(1991); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales 
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1988); Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. 
L. REV. 383, 383–86 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment 
as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 19–20 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth 
Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974)). 
 14. Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 364.  
 15. Id. at 349. 
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was even a search in Fourth Amendment terms, thus triggering the 
protections of the amendment. Second, if there was a search, a court must 
then determine whether the search was legal. Finally, if the search was 
illegal, the court must determine the proper remedy. In criminal 
proceedings, where this issue is most common, a court must determine 
whether it must prevent the government from using any illegally obtained 
evidence against the victim of the search or whether it can admit the 
evidence under an exception to the exclusionary rule.  
While the first step is generally well established, the second and third 
have been subject to substantial change. Warrants now play a lesser role in 
determining whether a search was legal, and the future existence of the 
exclusionary rule is uncertain. This Section explores these steps and shows 
how these two trends are changing the traditional methods for determining 
and remedying violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
1. What Is a Search? 
First, in order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, government 
action must constitute a search. Yet a search is not self-defining; since 
Katz v. United States,16 the Supreme Court has consistently held that “a 
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”17 
That is, in order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, the government 
must violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. What 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, though, is unclear.  
The case law contains some reference points. For instance, the Court 
has held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the telephone numbers they dial.18 The Court has also held that a person 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field with a 
clear “No Trespassing” sign19 or in a barn that requires hurdling five 
 
 
 16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 17. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 18. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). In Smith, police attached a device “at [a 
telephone company’s] central offices to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at [the 
defendant’s] home.” Id. at 737. The numbers dialed by the defendant were used as evidence in 
investigating a robbery, eventually leading to the defendant’s arrest. Id. 
 19. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). Oliver consisted of two companion 
cases. In the first, police officers drove to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign. Id. at 173. The 
officers walked around the gate and inspected the defendant’s farm, eventually finding a field of 
marijuana over a mile from the defendant’s house. Id. In the second case, police followed a footpath 
behind the defendant’s residence through the woods until they reached a secluded area where 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fences to reach.20 However, the Court has held that a bus passenger has a 
reasonable expectation that Border Patrol agents will not squeeze his 
luggage.21 
In the first three scenarios the Court held that the government intrusion 
in question was not a search,22 while in the fourth scenario the squeezing 
of luggage was.23 Yet identifying the reasoning behind these distinctions is 
difficult, and justifying them even more so. In one Justice’s opinion, 
expectations of privacy that are reasonable from a citizen’s perspective 
“bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that [the] 
Court considers reasonable.”24  
Further, an enforceable expectation of privacy must “be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”25 Yet one study by 
Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher found some disparity 
between the Court’s views of government investigations and that of the 
public.26 Slobogin and Schumacher asked subjects to rate the intrusiveness 
of fifty hypothetical searches on a scale from zero to one hundred, with 
one hundred being “Extremely Intrusive.”27 Based on the average 
intrusiveness, the authors then ranked the searches from one to fifty, with 
fifty being the most intrusive search.28 The study found that, for a number 
of searches, the general attitude of their subjects mirrored relevant 
Supreme Court decisions.29 For example, “hospital surgery on a shoulder 
([rank] = 40), a search of a bedroom ([rank] = 47), and bugging a phone 
 
 
marijuana was being grown. Id. at 174. This area, which also had visible “No Trespassing” signs, was 
owned by the defendant. Id. at 174–75. 
 20. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1987). In Dunn, a DEA agent and a city 
police officer entered the defendant’s ranch property without a warrant, first “cross[ing] over the 
perimeter fence and one interior fence” and then “over a barbed wire fence” to reach the defendant’s 
barn. Id. at 297. Looking in the barn and finding nothing of interest, the officers then “cross[ed] 
another barbed wire fence as well as a wooden fence” to reach a second barn. Id. at 297–98. Peering 
inside, the officers spotted a drug laboratory. Id. at 298. 
 21. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). In Bond, a border patrol agent 
boarded a bus to check the immigration status of the passengers. Id. at 335. While exiting the bus, the 
agent squeezed the bag stowed above the defendant’s seat and felt a “brick-like” object. Id. at 336. The 
agent searched the bag and found methamphetamine. Id. 
 22. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181–83; Dunn, 480 U.S. at 305; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
 23. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339. 
 24. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 26. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 774 (1993). 
 27. Id. at 735–36. The hypothetical searches were based primarily on Supreme Court and lower 
court case law. Id. at 735. 
 28. Id. at 737. 
 29. Id. at 739. 
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([rank] = 49) are seen as very intrusive searches, as the Court’s decisions 
suggest they should be.”30  
Yet there were a number of scenarios where the public attitude 
captured by the survey diverged from Supreme Court precedent.31 The 
search of an open field, while regarded by the Court as not triggering 
Fourth Amendment protection,32 received a “fairly high ranking” of 21 and 
a mean intrusiveness of 56.58.33 The authors point out that participants 
saw this scenario as more intrusive than a police pat down, which clearly 
has been established as a Fourth Amendment search requiring protection.34 
Further, the study found the use of undercover officers, such as the “covert 
use of a chauffer [or] secretary,” to be quite intrusive, ranked 31 and 34, 
respectively.35 The authors note that these ranked as more intrusive than 
searches of cars, which are considered Fourth Amendment searches.36 Yet 
the Court has held that the seemingly more intrusive use of undercover 
agents is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes on the ground that 
one assumes any risk regarding the disclosure of confidences by 
acquaintances.37 As this study indicates, the Court’s conception of what is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot always be divined from 
common experience. 
Perhaps the closest that one can come to an articulate statement on 
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search is that 
the ultimate question under Katz “is a value judgment,” namely, 
“whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the 
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the 
amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be 
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and 
open society.”38 
Thus, a court has some flexibility in determining whether police 
investigative techniques constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 
 
 
 30. Id. (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759–63 (1985); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763–65 (1969); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967)). 
 31. Id. at 740. 
 32. See supra notes 19–20. 
 33. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 26, at 740. 
 34. Id. at 741 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968)). 
 35. Id. at 740. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971)). 
 38. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 129 (4th 
ed. 2004) (quoting Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 403). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Was the Search Legal? 
Once a court determines that a government investigation constituted a 
Fourth Amendment search, it must address the more pressing, and even 
less clear, issue of whether the search violated the requirements of the 
amendment.39 While the standard for a search’s legality can be succinctly 
stated, its practical requirements in a concrete situation are amorphous. 
The Court has recognized this lack of clarity, noting: 
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not 
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case 
it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against 
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must 
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it 
is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which 
it is conducted.40 
Despite this lack of clarity, the case law does provide some indicia or 
guideposts for determining the legality of a search. First, the Fourth 
Amendment “usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an 
intrusion is based be capable of measurement against ‘an objective 
standard,’ whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test.”41 
However, objective does not mean obvious; as the Court declared in 
Illinois v. Gates, “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”42 In reviewing an 
 
 
 39. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 312 (1978)); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968); Camara v. Mun. 
Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 
(1977) (“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in 
all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19)). 
 40. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996) (“Reasonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances. In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead 
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”); Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37 
(“[T]ranslation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable 
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the 
members of [the] Court . . . . [T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”). 
 41. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (citations omitted). This less stringent test is often whether an officer 
had reasonable suspicion to engage in a less intrusive search. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 42. 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The same “totality of the circumstances” approach is used for 
determining whether police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a less intrusive search. Alabama v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/3
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application for a search warrant, the judicial officer need “simply to make 
a practical, common-sense decision whether . . . there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.”43 Yet this fair probability requires much less than certainty, as 
probable cause “does not demand any showing that [an officer’s] belief be 
correct or more likely true than false.”44 
Second, a search generally should be made pursuant to a warrant.45 One 
benefit of a warrant is impartiality; warrants provide the determination of a 
search’s legality by a “neutral and detached judicial officer”46 and not a 
“‘hurried . . . law enforcement officer, engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”47 Requiring warrants also prevents 
police from committing illegal searches, as the determination of whether a 
search is legal or not takes place before the search and its consequent 
invasion of privacy.48 The Court has even noted that in borderline cases, 
courts should tip the scales in favor of a search conducted pursuant to a 
warrant.49 
It is unclear, however, how often and in what cases a warrant is still 
required in order to render a search legal.50 Indeed, one persistent 
controversy in the Fourth Amendment debate is over the role of warrants. 
To some extent, the controversy stems from the unclear language of the 
Fourth Amendment51: while all agree that Fourth Amendment searches are 
governed by the reasonableness standard of the first clause,52 
 
 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 43. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 44. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
 45. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528–29; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 46. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979). 
 47. Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 48. Granted, a police officer whose proposed search is denied by a magistrate could conceivably 
still engage in the search, although without any new information the search would likely be per se 
unlawful. 
 49. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1967). 
 50. Wherever Fourth Amendment protection may end up, it is likely that homes will always 
receive significant protection and, in most cases, require a warrant. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is 
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”). 
 51. As James J. Tomkovicz points out, there are “precedential, textual, historical, policy, and 
symbolic arguments” for and against the warrant preference. James J. Tomkovicz, California v. 
Acevedo: The Walls Close In on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1992). 
While they all are very important, a recitation of them is beyond the scope of this Note. I use only the 
textual argument because it is particularly illustrative of the disagreement over the construction of the 
amendment. 
 52. The first clause reads, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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commentators divide on their conceptions of reasonableness.53 Critics of 
the warrant preference argue that there is no explicit requirement for 
warrants within the amendment, only the criteria requisite for a valid 
warrant.54 To these critics, the lack of a textual basis is dispositive.55 
Supporters of the warrant preference “root the warrant demand in the 
reasonableness requirement of the first clause.”56 In their view, “a 
‘reasonable search’ is one that has prior judicial approval.”57 
As has been discussed in great depth elsewhere, the Supreme Court 
once strongly favored the use of warrants. Thomas Y. Davies notes, 
For most of [the past] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed 
what is now called the “warrant-preference” construction of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a valid warrant—or 
at least compliance with the warrant standard of probable cause—is 
the salient factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure.58 
For some time, exceptions to the warrant preference were limited. But 
the Supreme Court has since created “a wide range of diverse situations [in 
which it has] recognized flexible, common-sense exceptions.”59 These 
now include cases of conducting a search under exigent circumstances,60 
searching someone who was just arrested and the area under the arrestee’s 
 
 
amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 53. Davies, supra note 4, at 559. 
 54. Tomkovicz, supra note 51, at 1125. 
 55. Id. at 1125–26. 
 56. Id. at 1126. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Davies, supra note 4, at 559 (footnote omitted). Indicative of this preference is Katz v. United 
States, where the Supreme Court declared, 
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts 
unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliberate, 
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police 
. . . . Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment 
requires adherence to judicial processes, and that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions. 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted) (omission in original). 
 59. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983). 
 60. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). These exigencies include “hot pursuit of a 
fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the 
risk of danger to the police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.” Id. (quoting State v. 
Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989) (citation omitted)). 
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control,61 searching a car incident to an arrest,62 and entering a home to 
prevent injury to an individual.63 As William J. Stuntz states, 
The Supreme Court, for its part, claims that the warrant [preference] 
is the centerpiece of the law of search and seizure, and that pre-
screening by neutral and detached magistrates is the heart of 
citizens’ protection against police overreaching. But the same Court 
regularly narrows the range of cases to which the warrant 
[preference] applies, so that in practice warrants are the exception 
rather than the rule.64 
Further, instead of its analysis turning on the presence or absence of a 
warrant, more and more often the Court analyzes police conduct in terms 
of reasonableness.65 That is, a search’s legality turns on a general 
evaluation of the interests served and impaired by the search.66  
The Court has thus strayed far from the warrant preference. Under this 
general reasonableness standard, police can make the initial determination 
of whether a search is permissible, and only after this search has occurred 
and been challenged does a judicial officer get to review its 
reasonableness. 
As Chief Justice Roberts recently stated in Brigham City, Utah v. 
Stuart, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”67 But what is and is not reasonable is open to 
interpretation, for “[t]here is no formula for the determination of 
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and 
circumstances.”68 Under this view, “the reasonableness of a search neither 
 
 
 61. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 62. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981). 
 63. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). See also Brown, 460 U.S. at 
735–36 (citing doctrinal cases for a variety of exceptions). 
 64. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 
(1991) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Stuntz, Warrants]. 
 65. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4, at 173–74. 
 66. Again, in Davies’ words: 
For several decades, the Supreme Court has been shifting away from the warrant-preference 
construction and toward what is now called the “generalized-reasonableness” construction, in 
which the value of the warrant is discounted and the constitutionality of a search or seizure is 
determined simply by making a relativistic assessment of the appropriateness of police 
conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances. 
Davies, supra note 4, at 559 (footnote omitted). 
 67. 126 S. Ct. at 1947 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 68. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931), quoted in United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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necessarily nor presumptively turns on the existence of a warrant.”69 Thus, 
a search can still be reasonable absent the protections of a warrant. 
3. What if the Search Is Unreasonable? 
The primary remedy for an unreasonable search is exclusion of any 
evidence obtained during the search.70 In 1914, the Supreme Court first 
fully articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.71 Holding 
that illegally seized evidence could not be introduced at trial,72 the Court 
declared: 
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the 
United States and Federal officials . . . under limitations and 
restraints as to the exercise of [their] power and authority, and to 
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against all unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . The tendency of 
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain 
conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no 
sanction in the judgments of the courts . . . .73 
While not beyond dispute,74 the Supreme Court has largely taken the 
view that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter Fourth Amendment 
 
 
 69. Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant 
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 542 (1997). 
 70. Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 360. The issue of whether government action constituted a 
reasonable Fourth Amendment search usually arises in a postsearch hearing to determine whether 
evidence must be excluded. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 5 (“[T]he practicing lawyer most frequently 
encounters the Fourth Amendment in the context of proceedings to determine whether the fruits of a 
search or seizure are to be admitted into evidence in a criminal case.”). 
 71. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 72. Id. at 398. 
 73. Id. at 391–92. 
 74. As Wayne R. LaFave states, “it is fair to say that the deterrence of unreasonable searches and 
seizures is a major purpose of the exclusionary rule.” 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 21. Many other 
commentators have concentrated on this deterrence purpose. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 
368; H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: Can One Trial Judge in One County in 
One State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6; Posner, 
Excessive Sanctions, supra note 8, at 638; Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 54; Christopher 
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 365; Jeffrey 
Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of Private Remedies for 
Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1443, 1445–46. LaFave points out two 
additional purposes of Fourth Amendment remedies: (1) judicial integrity and (2) public confidence. 1 
LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 21–22. Under the judicial integrity rationale, exclusion is supported on the 
ground that a court using illegally seized evidence is acting just as much in violation of the 
Constitution as the police officer who performed the illegal search. Id. Under the public confidence 
rationale, exclusion is justified on the ground that knowledge that the government will not benefit from 
illegal searches builds public trust and confidence. Id. at 22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/3
p 1101 Lammon book pages.doc5/5/2008 11:00:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE PRACTICAL MANDATES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1113 
 
 
 
 
violations.75 By revoking the benefit of an illegal search—namely the 
evidence often necessary to obtain a conviction—the exclusionary rule is 
thought to remove the incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment.76 
Deterrence has also been the impetus for expanding the reach of the 
exclusionary rule,77 as well as the reason for creating exceptions to the 
exclusion requirement.78  
The merit of the exclusionary rule has been at the center of much of the 
Fourth Amendment debate, with deterrence often the focus.79 
Commentators have both criticized and defended the rule on its ability to 
deter Fourth Amendment violations,80 with the majority of the literature 
being critical. Commentators often propose alternative remedies that do 
not require the exclusion of evidence.81 Perhaps most popular are money 
 
 
 75. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165–66 (2006) (weighing social costs against 
“deterrence benefits” in deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-
announce rule); id. at 2173 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that deterrence is “the driving legal purpose 
underlying the exclusionary rule”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–22 (1984) (determining 
whether to require exclusion of evidence obtained in good faith on a subsequently invalidated warrant 
by looking to the deterrent effect of such an action); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 
(1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and 
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures 
. . . .”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (calling the rule a “clear, specific, and constitutionally 
required—even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the 
incentive to disregard it.”). 
 76. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
 77. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (requiring the states to exclude illegally obtained evidence in 
order to deter Fourth Amendment violations by state officials). 
 78. See, e.g., Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166–68 (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to knock-
and-announce violations because the social costs of exclusion, as applied to this type of violation, 
outweigh the deterrent benefit); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (declining to extend exclusionary rule to 
“evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant” 
because the social costs of exclusion outweigh the deterrent benefit); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 454 (1976) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to evidence illegally obtained during a criminal 
investigation and presented in a subsequent civil trial because the social costs of exclusion outweigh 
the deterrent benefit); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (declining to exclude illegally obtained evidence 
from a grand jury proceeding because the “damage to [the proceeding] . . . outweighs the benefit of 
any possible incremental deterrent effect”). 
 79. Most commentators accept deterrence as the prime purpose of any remedy. See supra note 
74. 
 80. Compare Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 56 (calling the exclusionary rule “an 
exceptionally crude deterrent device” that “systematically overdeters”), with William C. Heffernan, 
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 878 (2000) 
(arguing that only a contingent exclusionary rule is adequate to deter police misconduct where the 
conduct is severe but the harm is slight). 
 81. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 74; Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to 
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 
(1978); Slobogin, supra note 74. 
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damages, such as fines and constitutional torts.82 Other proposed remedies 
include criminal sanctions for offending police officers,83 internal police 
discipline,84 reduced sentences for criminals convicted on illegally 
obtained evidence,85 or some combination.86 
Coupled with this academic criticism is an increasingly unfavorable 
view of the exclusionary rule in the Supreme Court. In the recent decision 
of Hudson v. Michigan,87 the Supreme Court held that knock-and-
announce violations,88 which violate the Fourth Amendment,89 do not 
require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the search.90 Erwin 
Chemerinsky argues that the Court’s majority opinion in Hudson “must be 
 
 
 82. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422–24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); Newman, supra note 81; Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7. For example, Newman argues 
that reformed § 1983 civil suits are a better deterrent than the exclusionary rule. Newman, supra note 
81, at 451–53. Beginning from the premise that most victims of illegal searches, often criminal 
defendants, face a low chance of success in suing the government, Newman argues for multiple 
reforms to § 1983 suits to improve those chances. Id. at 453. These reforms include making the United 
States the sole or additional plaintiff in a § 1983 suit, id. at 453, making police agencies and 
governments liable, id. at 456, abolishing the good faith defense and judicial and prosecutorial 
immunity, id. at 461–63, shifting the burden of proof to the defense to justify the challenged action 
after it is shown that the plaintiff was denied her liberty, id. at 464, and adding mandatory liquidated 
damages on top of compensatory damages, id. at 465. Newman speculates that these reforms would 
increase the likelihood of judgments in favor of plaintiffs, id. at 466, raising the costs of violating the 
Fourth Amendment. Under Newman’s reforms, this greater cost is a strong incentive to agencies and 
governments to take appropriate action to curtail constitutional violations. Id. at 456–57. 
 83. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 378–79. 
 84. See Caldwell, supra note 74. H. Mitchell Caldwell has argued for an alternate remedy due to 
“the exclusionary rule’s limited success in achieving its policy goal of deterring police officer 
violations of the Fourth Amendment as well as the distasteful effects of the rule.” Id. at 6. He proposes 
internal police discipline, coupled with optional exclusion, as an alternative. Id. at 5, 49. Such 
discipline would allow officers to “learn from their mistakes and conform their conduct to the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 50. Further, Caldwell claims that such direct sanctioning of the offending officer 
gives that officer and others in her department notice of such sanctioning, deterring them from 
committing illegal searches in the future. Id. at 51. 
 85. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (2003). 
Calabresi has suggested a postconviction hearing where wrongfully obtained evidence would result in 
a reduction in sentence. Id. at 116. Calabresi suggests, for example, reducing a sentence by two to four 
points on the sentencing guidelines. Id. Noting that this remedy would have little deterrent effect on 
police misconduct, Calabresi suggests automatic institutional punishment for police officers. Id. at 
116–17. The officer’s punishment would be a function of the officer’s behavior, with negligence 
receiving a slight punishment, gross negligence a greater punishment, and intentional wrongdoing a 
severe punishment. Id. 
 86. See Caldwell, supra note 74, at 49 (allowing a judge the option to exclude evidence if she 
finds internal police discipline to be inadequate); Standen, supra note 74, at 1484 (arguing for a 
combined system of exclusion and money damages). 
 87. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). 
 88. A knock-and-announce violation occurs when the police fail to knock and announce their 
presence prior to entering a dwelling. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932–33 (1995). In some 
cases, though, law enforcement interests may warrant an unannounced entry. Id. at 936. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168. 
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understood as calling for the complete elimination of the exclusionary 
rule.”91 While Justice Kennedy’s concurrence attempted to ease any 
concern over exclusion’s future,92 Chemerinsky warns that “the 
willingness of four Justices—Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—to 
overrule decades-old precedents and eliminate the exclusionary rule 
certainly gives a sense that major changes are likely ahead in 
constitutional law in the years to come.”93  
Particularly interesting was the Court’s discussion of alternative ways 
to deter Fourth Amendment violations. In response to the defendant’s 
suggestion “that without suppression there will be no deterrence of knock-
and-announce violations at all,”94 the Court offered the alternative 
deterrent of § 198395 and Bivens96 suits, both forms of constitutional 
torts.97 Echoing the view of many critics of the exclusionary rule, the 
Court suggested that these would be an adequate substitute for exclusion.98 
The Court also doubted the extent of Fourth Amendment violations due to 
increased police professionalism and, echoing other critics of exclusion, 
noted that internal police discipline deters illegal conduct.99 As such, many 
commentators, as well as a solid block of the Court, doubt the 
effectiveness of exclusion and instead would likely employ some 
alternative remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.  
As mentioned above, constitutional torts are one of the more popular 
alternatives to exclusion. The economic criticism of the exclusionary rule 
is particularly illustrative of the argument for constitutional torts.100 
 
 
 91. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 344 (2005). 
 92. Id. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (underscoring that, after 
Hudson, “the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled by [the Court’s] precedents, is not 
in doubt”). 
 93. Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 344. See also Craig M. Bradley, Mixed Messages on the 
Exclusionary Rule, TRIAL, Dec. 2006, at 56, 56 (“Four justices in the majority [in Hudson]—Antonin 
Scalia (the author), Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito—appear ready to eviscerate the 
exclusionary principle.”). 
 94. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 96. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 97. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2168. 
 100. The following presentation of the economic criticism is taken mostly from three of Judge 
Richard A. Posner’s pieces on the subject. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
(6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 8; 
Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7. Calling this argument the “economic” argument is not to imply that 
all economists or legal economists support this position. It is instead an illustrative example of 
traditional economic analysis applied to the Fourth Amendment debate. 
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Besides providing a justification for these torts, the economic criticism 
reveals some of the behavioral assumptions of the exclusionary debate.  
Embracing deterrence as the predominant purpose of Fourth 
Amendment remedies,101 the economic argument frames the issue as how 
best to achieve optimal deterrence.102 With this goal in mind, the argument 
assumes that defendants who get state evidence excluded receive a 
windfall while society pays an undue cost. The criminal’s damages from a 
search are defined as privacy and property interests and are assumed to 
have a relatively low value.103 But when evidence is excluded, a criminal 
defendant often goes free and thus receives a benefit valued at the criminal 
defendant’s interest in not being punished for her crime.104 One can very 
reasonably assume that this value of freedom from punishment is much 
greater than the value of the violated privacy and property interests. 
On the other side of the scale, society, through police action, has only 
violated and should only have to compensate for a citizen’s relatively 
 
 
 101. See Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 54 (“[D]eterrence is the raison d’être of the 
[exclusionary] rule.”). 
 102. Id. Posner defines optimum deterrence as setting the penalty for an offense “at the level that 
imposes on the offender a cost equal to the harm caused, as raised to reflect the possibility of his 
escaping punishment.” Id. Thus, optimal deterrence occurs when the penalty imposed equals the cost 
to the victim of the offense increased by the probability of apprehension and conviction. Id. at 54 n.17. 
Posner represents this with the formula f = C/p, with f being the fine to achieve optimal deterrence, C 
being the cost to the victim, and p being the probability of punishment. Id. In the context of Fourth 
Amendment remedies, C is the cost borne by the victim of the illegal search, often a criminal 
defendant. While normally a fine, f represents the price paid by the offender, or society, in the Fourth 
Amendment remedy. In the case of exclusion, f would be the cost of excluding evidence, which would 
often entail the freeing of a guilty defendant. In the case of tort damages, f would be the fine assessed 
on the officer, department, or government. For example, assuming that the harm caused by an illegal 
search could be valued at $100 (C = $100) and assuming perfect enforcement (p = 1.0), the cost 
imposed on the police officer who conducted the illegal search should equal $100 (f = $100). This 
deterrence is optimal because it would deter only searches that were not cost justified, or under 
Posner’s definition, unreasonable. Posner defines reasonable searches as those that are socially 
efficient. See infra note 108. 
 103. Posner assumes that the only interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are privacy 
interests against trespass to person or property. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 711. 
These costs are the lawful “property interests” and “interests in bodily integrity, mental tranquility, and 
freedom of movement” that are “traditionally protected by tort actions.” Posner, Rethinking, supra 
note 7, at 50–51. Further, these costs are “a function of the intrusiveness of a search.” Id. at 74. Note 
that Posner does not include the cost of criminal punishment. Id. at 59–60. Posner goes as far as to 
liken a police search of one’s home that interrupts one’s tranquility to an unwanted telephone 
solicitation. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 711. These assumptions are open to 
criticism on both conception and valuation. See Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence 
and Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647, 661–62 (1982) (arguing that Posner’s 
assumed values are “hypothetical and arbitrary” and that “Posner presents neither evidence of the 
actual dollar amounts that realistically might be assigned to his economic deterrence formula nor any 
method whereby they might reliably be ascertained”). 
 104. Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 8, at 638. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/3
p 1101 Lammon book pages.doc5/5/2008 11:00:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] THE PRACTICAL MANDATES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1117 
 
 
 
 
minor privacy and property interests. Yet the punishment imposed on 
society—namely exclusion resulting in a guilty defendant going free—is 
often a much greater punishment than simply compensating for privacy 
and property interests. Thus, society bears the much larger cost of freeing 
a guilty criminal.105 With this conception of the interests involved, the 
economic critique argues that the exclusionary rule systematically 
overdeters reasonable106 police searches.107 With such low damage to the 
individual and potentially high costs for society, the significant net cost 
from exclusion will deter reasonable searches.108  
The economic critique suggests a tort or damages remedy instead of 
exclusion.109 Under the economic theory of deterring illegal conduct,110 the 
optimal punishment is that which equals the expected gain from breaking 
the law111 but does not exceed the amount that results in a socially optimal 
outcome.112 This calculus involves a fine tuning of damages that cannot be 
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Posner gives an economic definition of reasonableness using a cost-benefit analysis, equating 
reasonable searches to those that have a positive net benefit, i.e., are socially optimal. See POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 712; Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 74. Thus, a search 
is reasonable if the cost in privacy violations to the search victim, outlined above, is outweighed by the 
costs of not obtaining a conviction, multiplied by the probability that the suspect will not be convicted 
without the search. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 712. In other words, where the 
value to society of conducting the search exceeds the penalty, i.e., the search is socially efficient, the 
state would conduct the search and reap the net benefit. If the value to society is below the penalty, or 
socially inefficient, the search is unreasonable and would not be conducted. While this definition rests 
on the arguable assumption that traditional property and privacy interests are the only interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the actual definition of reasonableness is irrelevant to this Note. 
 107. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 713; Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 
56. 
 108. Posner uses the following example to illustrate this point: 
Because of some oversight a search warrant is invalid and, as a result, evidence essential to 
the conviction of a dangerous criminal is suppressed. The cost to the criminal of this Fourth 
Amendment violation is $100 . . . , while the cost to the community of letting him go free is 
$10,000. The sanction in this case is excessive, unless only one percent of Fourth Amendment 
violations are caught, which seems unlikely. 
Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 55. In terms of Posner’s formula, see supra note 102, C would be 
the cost to the criminal of $100, while f would be the $10,000 cost to the community of letting her go. 
Thus, for this fine to optimally deter, p must equal 0.01, or a 1% chance of punishment, which Posner 
doubts. If p is greater than 0.01, reasonable searches will be deterred. 
 109. Id. at 53. 
 110. Remember that this discussion is about the police officer’s potential lawbreaking in 
performing an illegal search, not the underlying crime which led to the questioned search. 
 111. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 512 (5th ed. 2007); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 
50 (2000). 
 112. Although ideally all crimes should be prevented, law enforcement is costly, and the cost of 
deterring all law breaking would be prohibitive. Optimal crime deterrence thus occurs “where the 
marginal social cost of reducing crime further equals the marginal social benefit.” COOTER & ULEN, 
supra note 111, at 512. 
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accomplished through exclusion; the “damages” to society from exclusion 
are often equal to the social damage of letting the criminal go free. Also, 
because the economic argument conceptualizes the interests involved at 
such disparate amounts, police will hesitate to perform socially optimal 
searches due to the potentially disproportionate punishment of 
exclusion.113 A tort regime would allow courts to set the punishment for 
violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights equal to the actual 
harm to the individual.114 Because damages can be tailored to match the 
actual damage to the criminal defendant from an illegal search, the tort 
remedy can conceivably attain optimum deterrence.115 
B. Behavioral Assumptions in the Fourth Amendment Debate 
Both the Supreme Court’s move away from the warrant preference and 
the continued calls for replacing exclusion illustrate two behavioral 
assumptions at the center of the Fourth Amendment debate. The economic 
critique of exclusion also hints at the source of these assumptions. Plainly 
stated, the supporters of the move away from the warrant preference and 
exclusionary rule are implicitly assuming that the actors involved behave 
rationally. This assumption is borrowed from traditional economics116 and 
is one that has pervaded the last generation of legal scholarship.117 While 
 
 
 113. Posner, Excessive Sanctions, supra note 8, at 638. 
 114. This is probably not as simple as it sounds if one does not accept Posner’s conception of the 
interests harmed by an illegal Fourth Amendment search. For example, William J. Stuntz has argued 
that, while an illegal search can result in tangible harms, it can also cause intangible harms to the 
individual searched and, indirectly, to society through “the diminished sense of security that neighbors 
and friends may feel when they learn of the police misconduct.” Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 64, at 
902. Stuntz argues that these harms are “impossible to calculate.” Id. 
 115. Posner, Rethinking, supra note 7, at 56. 
 116. Rational choice theory has long been used in economics. Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith, 
Introduction to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1 (Francisco Parisi & Vernon 
Smith eds., 2005) (“Since the inception of Adam Smith’s invisible hand, economics has largely been 
guided by rational choice theorists who advance the notion that the logical pursuit of self-interest 
drives human choices in a free society and leads to prosperity.”). The Chicago approach to law and 
economics is considered, for the most part, traditional law and economics. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & 
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 94 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that “the Chicago approach 
to law and economics[] [is] an approach that has attracted a large following and has come to dominate 
scholarship within the economic analysis of the law”).  
 117. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) (“The concern 
of law and economics with how actors in and subject to the legal system respond to legal directives 
(and would respond to hypothesized changes in those directives) now permeates the mainstream of 
legal academic thought . . . .”); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s 
Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2003) (“[O]ur legal 
institutions rest on the same rationalist assumptions about human inference and decision making that 
underlie classic economics.”). 
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the strictness of the conception of rationality varies, the common thread is 
the notion that actors do not make systematic mistakes in judgment and 
decision making. 
To understand these assumptions, one must first understand their basis 
in economics. Economics has had an incredible influence on legal 
scholarship.118 While previously confined to areas such as antitrust and 
tax,119 economic analysis has since expanded into most areas of the law.120 
Always undergirding the economic analysis of law is the economic model 
of human behavior, namely rational choice theory.121 By providing legal 
scholarship with this cohesive model of human behavior, economics has 
changed legal discourse.122 
The traditional economic model of human behavior, while difficult to 
ascertain fully,123 predicts that humans act to maximize their expected 
 
 
 118. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 4 (“Economics has changed the nature of legal 
scholarship, the common understanding of legal rules and institutions, and even the practice of law.”). 
 119. Id. at 4; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 23. 
 120. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 4 (noting that economic analysis of law has 
“expanded into the more traditional areas of the law, such as property, contracts, torts, criminal law 
and procedure, and constitutional law”). See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 100, at 23 
(“[T]he hallmark of the ‘new’ law and economics . . . is the application of economics to the legal 
system across the board: to common law fields such as torts, contracts, restitution, and property; to the 
theory and practice of punishment; to civil, criminal, and administrative procedure; to the theory of 
legislation and regulation; to law enforcement and judicial administration; and even to constitutional 
law, primitive law, admiralty law, family law, and jurisprudence.”). 
 121. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1055. 
 122. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
433, 436 (“The single most important contribution that law and economics has made to the law is the 
use of a coherent theory of human decision making (‘rational choice theory’) to examine how people 
are likely to respond to legal rules.”). 
 123. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1060 (“[T]here is no single, widely accepted 
definition of rational choice theory. . . . In actuality, there are probably nearly as many different 
conceptions of rational choice theory as there are scholars who implicitly employ it in their work.”) 
(footnote omitted). Korobkin and Ulen illustrate a variety of conceptions of rational choice with 
varying degrees of predictive power. Id. at 1060–66 (borrowing the framework of DONALD P. GREEN 
& IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994)). For instance, the conception of 
rational choice theory commonly called “expected utility theory” posits that people always take the 
course of action that maximizes their net expected benefit. Id. at 1063. Yet expected utility theory 
gives no indication of the ends an individual aims to achieve, only the means by which she will try to 
attain those ends. Id. at 1062. What exactly provides a person with benefit is unknown. Thus, absent a 
violation of a few conditions, any behavior can be described in the language of rationality in the ex 
post. Id. at 1063. Without some information regarding an actor’s subjective preferences, it is 
impossible to accurately predict that actor’s behavior ex ante.  
 Take the common act of reshelving material in a library. If someone reshelves a book after using 
it, then we can say that the person derives some value, or utility, from being a considerate and 
responsible library patron and that this value is greater than the cost of reshelving the book. Thus, 
utility is maximized, and this choice is rational. However, if someone does not reshelve a book, then 
we can say that the value of being a considerate and responsible library patron is outweighed by the 
cost of reshelving the book. Thus, this choice is rational as well. In both situations, we can assume 
preferences such that each actor is maximizing their own utility. Yet if we see that person reading in 
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utility or self interest.124 Such a prediction makes certain assumptions 
about human judgment and decision making. Thomas S. Ulen describes 
these assumptions in what he calls the “bare bones of rational choice 
theory”: 
Decision-makers are rationally self-interested; they have complete, 
transitive, and reasonably stable preferences; they can learn about 
and compute the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action; 
and they seek to maximize as many of their preferences as they 
feasibly can. Where the outcomes of current action lie in the future, 
rational actors compute the probability of the various outcomes, 
evaluate the utility to them of those outcomes, and choose that 
action that promises the maximum expected utility.125 
This Section attempts to demonstrate how rational choice theory is 
behind the trends in Fourth Amendment doctrine discussed above. First, it 
demonstrates that criticisms of exclusion coupled with proposals for 
alternative remedies assume that people will act according to rational 
choice theory when faced with potential sanctions or punishments. 
Specifically, much of the criticism of exclusion focuses on the argument 
that exclusion, because it does not directly affect police, is a poor 
deterrent. Instead, some more direct sanction, such as monetary damages 
or fines, would better deter Fourth Amendment violations. This argument 
 
 
the library, any confident prediction about whether she will reshelf the book is impossible absent 
knowledge of her preferences. 
 Conceptions of rational choice with greater predictive power suffer from their own shortcomings. 
The most common conception of rational choice theory in law and economics is called “self interest 
theory.” Id. at 1064. Self interest theory posits that individuals will strive to maximize their self 
interest and will choose the means that will best achieve this end. Id. At first glance, this may not seem 
much different from expected utility theory. But self interest theory assumes that an actor’s ends come 
from her own desires; essentially, the theory assumes that individuals are selfish. Id. at 1065. 
 An example will help illustrate this. Consider again our library patron. While minor, there are 
costs to reshelving a book, most notably in the time spent finding its appropriate place. Under self 
interest theory, no one would reshelve the book as doing so imposes a cost that one can avoid 
(assuming there are no penalties for leaving books out on the library tables). Thus, we have an 
empirically falsifiable prediction. The problem is that our predictions are often incorrect. Id. at 1069. 
Books are left on tables and reshelved, meaning that, at least according to this conception, some 
people are behaving rationally and some are not. 
 Further, as the two examples of our library patron illustrate, conceptions of rationality assume that 
people have startling cognitive capabilities. People are thought to be able to calculate the expected 
costs and benefits of all available alternatives and choose the option that maximizes individual well-
being, however defined. See infra text accompanying note 125. Our library patron can instantly 
calculate which course of conduct, reshelving or not, makes her best off. 
 124. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1055. 
 125. Ulen, supra note 122, at 457. 
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rests on the assumption that the police behave according to rational choice 
theory in light of these remedial schemes.  
Second, this Section shows that the movement away from warrants and 
ex ante determinations of a search’s legality assumes that judges have the 
cognitive capability to evaluate a search ex post exactly the same as they 
would have ex ante. That is, by allowing more searches to be evaluated 
after they have occurred, the Court is necessarily implying that judges are 
able to rationally process only legally admissible information and ignore 
any inadmissible information. This assumed ability to cognitively partition 
information reflects an influence of rational choice theory. 
1. The Deterrence of Police 
First, in relation to deterring unlawful police conduct, is critics’ 
application of the model of the rational lawbreaker.126 This individual is 
assumed to break the law only when the expected benefits of that conduct, 
such as monetary gain, outweigh the expected costs, such as fines or 
imprisonment.127 In order to prevent lawbreaking, rational choice theory 
indicates that the expected punishment should be set above the expected 
gain from the lawbreaking.128 This can be accomplished by either raising 
 
 
 126. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 494–98. While Cooter and Ulen use the term 
“rational crime,” “rational lawbreaking” will be used here to avoid confusing the lawbreaker in an 
illegal search (the police officer) with the victim (a suspected criminal). 
 127. See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 116, at 268, 268; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 
111, at 47 (noting the economic theory of law enforcement argues that an individual contemplating 
performing a harmful act will only do so “if his expected utility from doing so, taking into account his 
gain and the chance of his being caught and sanctioned, exceeds his utility if he does not commit the 
act”), cited in Jolls, supra, at 272. Rational lawbreaking, whether premeditated or impulsive, is 
assumed to conform to the predictions of rational choice theory. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 
501. Cooter and Ulen argue that decision making in premeditated lawbreaking may conform with the 
economic model, while impulsive crime may appear as if it had been deliberated and thus also 
conforms with the theory. Id. 
 Note also that the individual would only weigh the gain of the crime against expected costs, or the 
statutory punishment discounted by the probability of evading punishment. Law enforcement is not 
perfect, and crimes go unpunished. Thus, the expected penalty from committing a crime is less than 
the statutory penalty. For example, if the fine for breaking a certain law was $100 and the probability 
of punishment was 10%, the expected punishment would be $10. This model is a simplified form of a 
full model of optimal law enforcement but is sufficient for the purposes of this Note. For a full 
discussion of the economic theory of optimal law enforcement, see id. at 510–17; Polinsky & Shavell, 
supra note 111. 
 128. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 512. As Korobkin and Ulen note in relation to general 
deterrence of undesired behavior, deterring 100% of certain conduct would likely be prohibitively 
costly. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1092. Thus, “[f]or any type of conduct the state wishes to 
discourage . . . , rational choice theory advises policy makers to set the penalty for the undesirable 
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the probability of detection and punishment or increasing the statutory 
penalty.  
For example, consider a potential criminal deciding whether to steal a 
car. The economic theory postulates that this actor will determine the 
value of stealing the car and weigh that against the expected punishment 
for stealing the car. The expected punishment would be the likely statutory 
penalty, such as a prison term, discounted by the probability of detection 
and punishment.  
The model of the rational lawbreaker is applied in criticism of the 
exclusionary rule when discussing how best to deter police (in the Fourth 
Amendment search context, one must remember that it is the police who 
are the potential lawbreakers). In relation to the illegal search, exclusion is 
remote in both time and space. Further, some argue that the costs of 
exclusion are actually borne by judges and prosecutors, not the police 
officers.129 This means that the expected cost of an illegal search to the 
individual officer could be quite low and thus a weak deterrent.  
Economic analysis thus tells us that more direct and immediate 
sanctions, such as fines or disciplinary punishment, would be better 
deterrents than exclusion.130 Such an argument reflects the assumption of a 
rational response to an increase in expected costs by the rational 
lawbreaker. The argument assumes that the direct sanction will affect, or 
punish, the officer more than exclusion does and thus will increase the 
potential cost of conducting an illegal search. With this cost increased, the 
police officer would respond by decreasing the number of illegal searches 
she conducts so as to avoid the increased costs. To do so is only rational. 
2. The Cognitive Abilities of Judges 
The second way in which rational choice theory is reflected in the 
current Fourth Amendment debate is more subtle. As evidenced in Ulen’s 
bare-bones description of rational choice theory, actors are assumed to 
have rather incredible cognitive abilities.131 Rational choice theory 
indicates that individuals are able to process complicated information 
rationally to arrive at accurate judgments. The movement away from the 
warrant preference indicates a similar confidence in the cognitive 
 
 
conduct such that the desired fraction of the population . . . will calculate that the expected costs of the 
conduct exceed the expected benefits to them.” Id. 
 129. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 130. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 74, at 48. 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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capabilities of judges. I am not referring to judges’ ability to apply the 
rather amorphous standards of the Fourth Amendment; the substance of 
that analysis does not change from before a search to after a search. I am 
instead referring to the ability of judges to mechanically determine 
reasonableness absent any influence or bias and arrive at an accurate 
determination.132 
The legality of a search depends on the facts known to the police 
before the search occurs; any subsequently discovered evidence cannot 
render an already-performed search reasonable at the time of its inception. 
Warrants are ideal for this determination, as legality is necessarily 
determined when the only information available is the information known 
prior to conducting the search. But by loosening the warrant preference 
and allowing a search’s legality to be determined after it has occurred, the 
Court is implicitly assuming that a judge will be unaffected by any 
subsequent information. That is, the Court must be thinking that a judge 
can cognitively place herself at a prior point in time and make a judgment 
that considers only the legally admissible information. This sort of 
informational partitioning is an intellectual feat typical of the rational 
actor. 
III. A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
If these behavioral assumptions are accurate, the current trend in 
Fourth Amendment law may be compelling; the economic conception of 
behavior provides little theoretical basis for keeping the exclusionary rule 
or warrants. Yet current research in behavioral science has shown that the 
economic theory of behavior is flawed. With the current direction of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine premised on such flawed assumptions, the 
wisdom of this direction is highly suspect. 
 
 
 132. William Stuntz has discussed the possible influence of bias in determinations of a search’s 
legality. In discussing judicial bias in determining whether to exclude evidence, Stuntz hinted at the 
effect of hindsight, discussed further below. See Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 64, at 911–12. Stuntz 
focused more on the potential judicial bias from the character of the defendant and her “inherently 
unsympathetic” nature. Id. at 912. Yet, he also noted that “[i]t must be much harder for a judge to 
decide that an officer had something less than probable cause to believe cocaine was in the trunk of a 
defendant’s car when the cocaine was in fact there,” and that timing problems “tend to overestimate 
the magnitude of some kinds of risks.” Id. (citing two studies on hindsight bias). Thus, instead of 
solely discussing personal or moral biases against deciding in favor of a criminal and against the 
police, Stuntz recognized that there may be inherent cognitive shortcomings that prevent accurate 
determinations. While his intuition was partially correct, a deeper analysis is necessary to understand 
the potential distortions in Fourth Amendment decision making. 
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A. Bounded Rationality 
A growing body of research is making plain the fact that people do not 
behave as rational choice theory predicts. However, this research is not 
just identifying the ways in which rational choice theory fails; it is also 
providing an alternative to rational choice theory by developing ways to 
better predict behavior. Building on the work of Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky in cognitive psychology and Richard H. Thaler in 
economics, scholars in the behavioral sciences are uncovering the ways in 
which people’s behavior systematically deviates from that predicted by 
rational choice theory.133 In particular, behavioral science has identified a 
number of bounds on judgment and decision making.134 By considering 
these bounds, behavioral science, particularly in the law, can better predict 
how humans will actually act135 and perhaps provide new life for old legal 
debates.136  
One bound that directly challenges traditional notions of rational 
choice theory is “bounded rationality.” Bounded rationality “refers to the 
obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite. We have 
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.”137 In 
particular, people “are systematically biased in their predictions of the 
probable results of various events.”138 Many of these biases are due to the 
use of mental shortcuts, or heuristics.139 People are faced with nearly 
infinite information and, accordingly, nearly infinite possible courses of 
action. Processing all of this information to arrive at an optimal outcome, 
as predicted by rational choice theory, is impossible. Mental shortcuts 
allow us to filter this information and make a decision.140 As Korobkin and 
 
 
 133. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL 
ECONOMICS (1991). 
 134. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1476.  
 135. Id. (“The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore the implications 
of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law.”). 
 136. As Korobkin and Ulen point out, traditional economics’ “rationality assumption [of human 
behavior] severely limits its continued scholarly development.” Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 
1055. 
 137. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1477 (footnote omitted). This conception of human 
cognitive capability is a far cry from the conception that Ulen outlined in describing the bare-bones of 
rationality. Compare supra text accompanying note 125. 
 138. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1085. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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Ulen note, “without . . . mental shortcuts, the task of making even 
relatively simple decisions would become so complex that daily life would 
almost certainly grind to a halt.”141 Yet while these valuable shortcuts 
economize information processing, they also often result in systematic 
biases in judgment and decision making.142 
Two mental shortcuts may significantly affect the debate over the 
proper Fourth Amendment scheme: overconfidence bias and hindsight 
bias. The next Sections discuss these biases and reveal their impact on the 
Fourth Amendment debate. 
B. Overconfidence Bias and Policing Police 
Overconfidence bias refers to people’s perception “that good things are 
more likely than average to happen to [them] and bad things are less likely 
than average.”143 In some cases, what one perceives to be overconfidence 
may be justified; an individual, due to her superior skill or talent, may 
actually be more likely than average to have something good happen to 
her.144 But, statistically speaking, not everyone can be above average. 
Overconfidence bias is evident, and at least some people’s beliefs are 
erroneous, when the majority of people see themselves as better situated 
than average. 
A number of studies have uncovered such erroneously overconfident 
beliefs. In reviewing experiments on risk perception among smokers, Neil 
D. Weinstein concluded “that smokers substantially underestimate their 
own personal risk.”145 Weinstein’s research showed that “smokers tend to 
conclude that they are less likely to suffer health effects than other 
smokers.”146 Further, “[s]mokers claim that their risk of smoking-related 
illness is ‘slightly less than,’ ‘equal to,’ or only ‘slightly greater than’ that 
of the ‘average person.’”147 In particular, smokers claim that “their own 
risk [of lung cancer] is ‘a bit higher’ than average,” while “[t]heir actual 
risk . . . may be more than 10 times the risk of a non-smoker.”148  
 
 
 141. Id. at 1076. 
 142. Id. at 1087; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1477. 
 143. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1091. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Neil D. Weinstein, Accuracy of Smokers’ Risk Perceptions, 1 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 
S123, S126 (1999). 
 146. Id. (citation omitted). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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This misperception of personal susceptibility to risk is an example of 
overconfidence bias at work. As Weinstein notes, “[p]eople may be quite 
aware of well-publicized risks and even over-estimate their numerical 
probability, but resist the idea that the risks are personally relevant.”149 
And even with accurate knowledge of the abstract probability of a 
negative event, individuals minimize their judgment of its likelihood as to 
themselves. As is likely with other hazardous behaviors,150 Weinstein’s 
research indicates that smokers “minimize the size of [their] risk and show 
a clear tendency to believe that the risk applies more to other smokers than 
to themselves.”151 
Other studies have echoed this biased judgment of the personal 
likelihood of negative events. In one study, Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. 
Emery asked recent marriage license applicants about the likelihood of 
divorce among the general population as well as expectations the 
applicants had about their own marriage.152 While the applicants were 
largely accurate in predicting the likelihood of divorce among the general 
population,153 they were quite optimistic as to their own marriage: “the 
median response of the marriage license applicants was 0% when 
assessing the likelihood that they personally would divorce.”154  
In another study, Weinstein asked college students to estimate their 
likelihood “of experiencing future life events [as compared to] the average 
chances of their classmates.”155 Weinstein found that “students tend to 
believe that they are . . . less likely [than their peers] to experience 
negative events.”156 For example, on average, the students believed 
themselves to be 58.3% less likely than their peers to have a drinking 
problem.157 For every student who perceived herself to be more likely than 
average to have a drinking problem, more than seven students believed 
 
 
 149. Id. at S128. 
 150. Id. Weinstein suggests that similar views would be prevalent among people engaged in 
“heavy drinking, unsafe sex, and speeding in automobiles.” Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions 
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 441 (1993), 
discussed in Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1091. 
 153. Id. at 442. The median response for “the percent of couples in the U.S. who marry today who 
will get divorced at some time in their lives” was 50%, the “closest correct approximation” at the time. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 154. Id. at 443. 
 155. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERS. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 806, 809 (1980), discussed in Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1091. 
 156. Id. at 818. 
 157. Id. at 810. 
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that they were less likely than average.158 The students also believed 
themselves to be 48.7% less likely than their peers to be divorced, with the 
ratio of “less likely” to “more likely” responses at over nine to one.159 
Overconfidence is not limited to the occurrence of negative life events. 
In the same study, Weinstein found that “students [also] tend to believe 
that they are more likely than their peers to experience positive events.”160 
For example, on average, the students believed themselves to be 50.2% 
more likely than their peers to like their postgraduation job.161 
Overconfidence also affects assessments of self in a positive direction. In 
one study, Ola Svenson asked American and Swedish subjects to compare 
their skill and safety as drivers to other subjects of the study.162 Svenson 
found that 88% of the American subjects and 77% of the Swedish subjects 
“believed themselves to be safer than the median driver.”163 Further, 93% 
of the American subjects and 69% of Swedish subjects “believed 
themselves to be more skillful drivers than the median driver.”164 Among 
the American subjects, 46.3% believed themselves to be among the top 
20% most skillful drivers.165 
Christine Jolls has argued that overconfidence bias may change the 
way we approach law enforcement.166 As discussed above, the traditional 
economic argument for public law enforcement sets the penalty of 
breaking a law at or above the lawbreaker’s expected gain, yet not so high 
that it deters efficient conduct.167 With the expected costs of breaking the 
law equal to or exceeding the expected benefits, the rational lawbreaker 
would thus not break the law. The success of this prediction depends on a 
potential lawbreaker “calculat[ing] in a fully rational way the costs—given 
the probability of detection—and benefits of [breaking that law] and then 
[making] fully optimal decisions about how to behave.”168 Yet 
overconfidence skews this assessment. 
 
 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 818. 
 161. Id. at 810. 
 162. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 144 (1981). 
 163. Id. at 146. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Jolls, supra note 127. 
 167. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
 168. Jolls, supra note 127, at 268. 
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As shown above, “people underestimate the probability that negative 
events will happen to them as opposed to others.”169 Because detection and 
punishment for breaking the law is likely regarded as a negative event, 
people will perceive themselves as less likely than average to have their 
lawbreaking detected and punished.170 Given this erroneous estimate, 
“actors will tend to be less deterred from the behavior sought to be 
deterred than they would be in the absence of [overconfidence] bias; the 
bias leads them to underestimate in a systematic way the probability that 
they will be detected [and punished].”171 
An example may help illustrate this point. Consider the common 
deterrent of speeding tickets. A fine for speeding, under traditional 
economic analysis that does not take account of overconfidence, would be 
set at some amount near the value of speeding to an individual, increased 
by the probability of detection and punishment. In the face of this potential 
punishment, rational drivers would no longer speed, as any gain from 
speeding would be offset by the expected punishment. 
If drivers are boundedly rational and exhibit overconfidence bias, fines 
for speeding may not attain their goal. As shown above, people not only 
underestimate their likelihood of encountering negative events, but they 
are also overconfident in their driving ability. It is not too much of a leap 
to then assume that people will underestimate the likelihood that their 
driving at an excessive speed will result in punishment. If this is the case, 
speeding tickets set at an amount thought to deter rational drivers will be 
less effective than predicted. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, overconfidence changes the way we 
think about deterring police. Police officers, like most other people, likely 
underestimate the probability of negative events.172 And the exclusion of 
evidence a police officer uncovers (albeit illegally) is undoubtedly a 
negative event; exclusion can lead to a criminal avoiding punishment 
entirely. Due to overconfidence, police will underestimate the probability 
that an illegal search will be detected and punished, and thus they lose 
some of the incentive to refrain from conducting illegal searches. 
Because it does not take account of overconfidence bias, the rationality 
assumption in criticisms of the exclusionary rule is flawed. Any remedy 
 
 
 169. Id. at 273. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 274. 
 172. Empirical research on this point is necessary before we can be certain that police suffer from 
overconfidence in this particular context. The need for further empirical research is discussed further 
below. See infra Part V. 
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that does not take account of overconfidence bias will fail to attain its 
predicted deterrence. For example, a fine for illegal searches could be set 
to some amount approximating the police officer’s gain when increased by 
the probability that the illegal search will be detected and punished. At this 
amount, Fourth Amendment violations supposedly become too costly and 
police cut back on them. But if police officers perceive themselves as less 
likely to have their illegal searches detected and punished, the fine will be 
much less effective than predicted. The same holds true for constitutional 
torts or other administrative penalties. As such, the proffered alternatives 
to exclusion, at least in their present form, would likely not attain their 
predicted deterrence. 
C. Hindsight Bias and Determining Reasonableness 
Hindsight bias refers to the effect outcome information has on an ex 
post judgment of the ex ante probability of that outcome.173 Simply stated, 
the fact that an event actually happened will increase one’s perception of 
the likelihood of that event happening.174 In one often-cited study, five 
groups were given a brief account of the British conflict with the Gurkas 
in Nepal and then asked to predict the likelihood of four possible 
outcomes for the conflict.175 One group received no information on the 
outcome of the conflict, while four groups were each told that a different 
outcome actually happened.176 Participants in the four groups with 
outcome knowledge consistently overestimated the likelihood of their 
given outcome compared to the probability predicted by the group with no 
 
 
 173. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1096. 
 174. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment 
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 292 
(1975) (“Reporting an outcome’s occurrence consistently increases its perceived likelihood and alters 
the judged relevance of data describing the situation.”). 
 175. Id. at 289. The four possible outcomes were “(a) British victory, (b) Gurka victory, (c) 
military stalemate with no peace settlement, and (d) military stalemate with a peace settlement.” Id. 
The actual outcome was a British victory. Id. at 291. 
 176. Id. at 289. Thus, one group received only the passage describing the conflict while the other 
four groups received the passage plus one additional sentence on the outcome of the conflict, “such as, 
‘The two sides reached a military stalemate, but were unable to come to a peace settlement.’” Id. The 
groups were then asked to determine “the probability of occurrence of each of the four possible 
outcomes.” Id. 
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outcome knowledge.177 Many other studies have demonstrated hindsight 
bias in a variety of contexts.178 
As discussed above, a common implicit assumption in the Fourth 
Amendment debate is that the system of determining illegal searches is 
accurate. While few would likely argue that the system is perfect, there has 
been little attention paid to the inner cognitive process of determining 
whether a search was legal once it gets to court. Yet, one failure that is 
sometimes discussed is the effect of hindsight on determinations of 
reasonableness.179 This determination is made after the search has been 
conducted and any incriminating evidence is or is not found. While “the 
hindsight bias is a threat to accurate determinations in many areas of [the] 
 
 
 177. Id. at 290. The group with no outcome knowledge estimated the probability of the four 
outcomes at (a) 33.8%, (b) 21.3%, (c) 32.3%, and (d) 12.3%. Id. at 291. In contrast, the groups that 
received outcome knowledge estimated their given outcome to be (a) 57.2%, (b) 38.4%, (c) 48.0%, 
and (d) 27.0%. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 350 (1977) (finding that subjects told the answer 
to a general knowledge question overestimate the likelihood that they would have answered the 
question correctly compared to actual rates of correct answers from people not told the answer); Kim 
A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995) (finding that hindsight bias influences determinations of negligence where 
“[a] majority of participants [with outcome knowledge] judged the choice made by over three quarters 
of [those without outcome knowledge] to be negligent”); Erik Hölzl, Erich Kirchler & Christa Rodler, 
Hindsight Bias in Economic Expectations: I Knew All Along What I Want to Hear, 87 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 437, 442 (2002) (finding that subjects overestimated the probability of economic 
developments that did occur as opposed to their ex ante predictions of probability before the events 
occurred). 
 179. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 570 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “inherent 
risks of hindsight at postseizure hearings”); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 
(1976) (noting that one purpose of the warrant preference “is to prevent hindsight from coloring the 
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure”); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 493 
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The question is not how those warrants are to be viewed in 
hindsight, but how they were in fact viewed by those executing them.”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective determination 
of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event 
justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of 
hindsight judgment.”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 n.12 (1963) (“A search of the record with the 
aid of hindsight may lend some support to the conclusion that, contra the reasonable belief of the 
officers, petitioners may not have been prepared for an imminent visit from the police.”); United States 
v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rosenn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The 
advantage of hindsight distorts the reasonableness inquiry in fourth amendment cases. Once we know 
that a search did turn up evidence of crime, we are more likely to view as well-founded suspicions 
which at the time would have appeared groundless, and arbitrary action of police as intuitive and 
discerning.”); United States v. Scott, 522 F.2d 1333, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Robinson, J., dissenting in 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“[An objective reasonableness standard for wiretaps creates a] grave 
danger that determinations of reasonableness will be dictated by hindsight evaluations of evidence 
uncovered by wiretaps. This, in turn, is bound to generate a strong temptation to wiretap first and then 
use the fruits of the interception in an effort to demonstrate that the intrusion was justified.”). 
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law,”180 this scenario is particularly ripe for hindsight’s manipulation. 
Because Fourth Amendment doctrine is so amorphous and contains such 
latitude for decision making,181 there is significant room for hindsight to 
covertly affect a determination of reasonableness. 
Lay people have consistently demonstrated evidence of biased 
determinations of reasonableness when judging in hindsight. In one study, 
subjects played the role of jurors in a civil case in which the plaintiff 
claimed that his civil rights had been violated by a police search of his 
apartment.182 While all of the subjects were given the same initial set of 
facts,183 the authors of the study provided the subjects with one of three 
possible outcomes: the discovery of a significant amount of heroin 
(guilty), the discovery of nothing (not guilty), and no knowledge of the 
outcome of the search whatsoever (neutral).184 In assessing the amount of 
damages to award the plaintiff, subjects who received the “guilty” ending 
awarded “substantially lower damage awards” than those who received the 
“not guilty” and “neutral” endings.185 The authors concluded that this 
disparity in damage awards was due to hindsight bias affecting 
interpretation of the facts.186 This study was later refined and repeated, 
again finding that outcome knowledge affected damage awards.187 
In the Slobogin and Schumacher study, subjects were asked to rate the 
intrusiveness of various hypothetical searches. Some subjects were not 
told the goal of the search while others were given a description of the 
“evidence being sought or the crime being investigated.”188 Subjects who 
 
 
 180. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 801 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judicial Mind]. 
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Janice R. Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes and 
Decision-Making in Search and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 101 (1988). 
 183. In short, the facts concerned an informant telling two police officers that a large heroin sale 
was going to occur in a particular apartment. Id. at 101–02. 
 184. Id. at 102. 
 185. Id. at 104. Asked to award damages between $0 and $50,000, subjects with neutral outcome 
knowledge awarded $22,748 on average, and subjects with “not guilty” outcome knowledge awarded 
$24,834 on average; subjects with “guilty” outcome knowledge awarded $16,090 on average. Id. at 
105. 
 186. Id. at 110–11. The authors rejected the explanation that subjects did not want to reward 
“wrongdoing,” as an accompanying questionnaire showed that the subjects who received the “guilty” 
outcome “were significantly less likely to believe that the police had misbehaved” in conducting the 
search in question. Id. at 104–05. 
 187. Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and 
the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 300 (1989). 
 188. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 26, at 735–36. For example, subjects told of the police 
objective received hypotheticals such as “[a] search of a garbage can for evidence of forgery,” while 
those not told the police objective received “[a] search of a garbage can.” Id. at 736 (emphasis 
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were told what the police were looking for rated the searches as less 
intrusive than those who were not told of the police objective.189 While the 
authors directed their subjects to assume that the party subject to the 
search was innocent,190 the authors speculated that subjects who were told 
what evidence the police were looking for might have assumed that the 
evidence would be found.191 If the subjects did assume that evidence 
would be found, then their ratings of intrusiveness could have been 
affected by the presumed guilt of the individual; i.e., it is less intrusive to 
search a guilty individual. In this case, hindsight bias distorted the analysis 
of police conduct.192 
While hindsight bias in the Fourth Amendment context has been 
documented in lay people, judges are more complicated. Two studies by 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, and Andrew J. Wistrich explored 
hindsight bias’s effect on judges.193 In the first study, a group of judges 
was given a short description of a lower-court decision that was 
appealed.194 The judges were randomly assigned one possible appellate 
court disposition (Lesser sanction, Affirmed, or Vacated).195 They were 
also told of the two other possible outcomes and asked which of the three 
 
 
omitted). Subjects were also told to evaluate the search either as if it was happening to them or as if the 
search was occurring in the abstract to some unspecified third party. Id. at 735. 
 189. Id. at 759. Subjects rated the intrusiveness, or “invasion of privacy or autonomy”, from zero 
to one hundred, with one hundred being “Extremely Intrusive.” Id. at 736. The mean intrusiveness of 
third-person searches without a given police objective was 59.26 while the mean intrusiveness of third-
person searches with a given police objective was 48.93. Id. at 759. The mean intrusiveness of first-
person searches without a police objective was 63.19 while the mean intrusiveness of first-person 
searches with a police objective was 54.95. Id. 
 190. Id. at 736. 
 191. Id. at 761. This was only a hypothetical interpretation, as it was unclear how the survey 
respondents interpreted the condition of the police objective. Id. If the subjects interpreted the 
objective at face value and only assumed that the police had an objective, this knowledge might have 
led them to decide that the search was less intrusive. Id. If instead the objective was interpreted to 
mean that achieving the objective (e.g., finding contraband) was achieved or more likely to be 
achieved, then the data indicates hindsight bias. Id. 
 192. See id. at 761, 771. See also Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Hindsight Bias and Third-Party 
Consentors to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305, 312 (1991) (finding that 
subjects viewed a third-party consentor to a search, such as a roommate, as more justified in permitting 
a search when evidence was uncovered in the search and less justified if no evidence was uncovered). 
 193. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judicial Mind, supra note 180; Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) [hereinafter Wistrich, Guthrie & 
Rachlinski, Inadmissible Information]. See also, Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judicial Mind, supra 
note 180, at 804 n.125 (citing other studies that demonstrate hindsight bias affecting judges). 
 194. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judicial Mind, supra note 180, at 801–02. The scenario 
involved a § 1983 case that was dismissed, with the plaintiff fined under Rule 11. Id. at 801. 
 195. Id. at 802. 
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was most likely to occur.196 Many of the judges assigned the outcome they 
were given as the most likely outcome.197 For example, of those “told that 
the court of appeals had affirmed, 81.5% of the judges indicated that they 
would have predicted that result.”198 The study thus found that “judges 
exhibited a predictable hindsight bias” in assessing the probability of 
various outcomes of an appeal.199 
The second study, in contrast, indicated that judges were not affected 
by hindsight in the Fourth Amendment context. In studying judges’ ability 
to disregard inadmissible or legally inadmissible information, the authors 
“explore[d] whether judges [could] disregard the outcome of a search 
when deciding whether the police had probable cause to conduct the 
search in the first place.”200 One group of judges was given a factual 
scenario involving a suspicious automobile and asked whether they would 
issue a warrant for a search.201 A second group was given the same factual 
scenario but told that the police officer searched the car without requesting 
a warrant, uncovering a large amount of drugs and a gun.202 These judges 
were asked whether they would exclude this evidence from trial.203 In both 
cases, the judges were, in effect, being asked whether there was probable 
cause to search the automobile. 
The study found no statistically significant difference between ex ante 
and ex post assessments of probable cause.204 There was thus “no evidence 
that the hindsight bias affected [a] judge[’s] assessments of probable 
cause.”205 Noting that “[t]he vast literature on the hindsight bias includes 
virtually no studies that fail to uncover evidence of the hindsight bias in ex 
post assessments of ex ante probabilities,” the authors were surprised by 
their finding.206 They rejected the possibility that judges had learned to 
 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. “[O]nly 27.8% of those told the court of appeals had vacated, and only 40.4% of those 
told that the court of appeals had remanded for imposition of a lesser sanction, indicated that 
affirmance was the most likely outcome.” Id. 
 199. Id. at 803. 
 200. Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Inadmissible Information, supra note 193, at 1313. 
 201. Id. at 1315. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. This particular factual scenario is ideal for their experiment. As the authors note, searches 
of automobiles are an exception to the warrant preference, but “police sometimes do request warrants 
for automobile searches to ensure the admissibility of evidence uncovered during the search.” Id. at 
1316 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)). 
 204. Id. Of those asked to issue a warrant, 23.9% “concluded that there was probable cause,” 
while of those asked to exclude the evidence, 27.7% “concluded that there was probable cause.” Id. 
 205. Id. at 1317. 
 206. Id. 
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avoid hindsight bias in general, as “several other studies show judges are 
influenced by hindsight bias in other situations.”207 Further, there was no 
evidence of experience mitigating hindsight bias.208 
The authors see two possible explanations for the lack of hindsight bias 
in this scenario. The first “is that ‘probable cause’ assessments do not 
actually depend upon the likelihood that a search produces incriminating 
evidence,” turning instead on the appropriateness of police conduct.209 Yet 
the authors question this hypothesis, as “a judgment of appropriate police 
conduct would also seem likely to be influenced by the outcome of the 
search.”210 A more compelling explanation “is that judges have developed 
informal heuristics which they use to assess probable cause.”211 Applying 
various mental shortcuts such as finding a search illegal when its only 
basis is an assertion of suspicion, judges’ determinations of probable cause 
may not consider the underlying facts closely enough to be affected by 
hindsight.212 Ultimately, as the authors acknowledge, the reasons for 
judges’ seeming immunity to hindsight bias in the Fourth Amendment 
context needs more study.213 
The effect of hindsight on Fourth Amendment violations is troubling 
both in principle and for its effect on deterrence. First, inaccurate 
determinations of reasonableness mean that Fourth Amendment rights are 
potentially being incorrectly enforced. Criminal defendants who are 
victims of objectively unreasonable searches have a right to some form of 
recourse. When incriminating evidence causes a decision maker to 
erroneously find a search valid, this recourse is denied. In a similar vein, 
police officers are not to be punished for conducting an objectively 
reasonable search that violates no constitutional rights. If no incriminating 
evidence is found but a decision maker erroneously finds a search illegal, 
the officer is liable for conduct society would encourage if not for the 
influence of hindsight. 
While the potential inaccuracy of determinations of Fourth Amendment 
violations is troubling in and of itself, hindsight bias can also affect 
deterrence, as any Fourth Amendment remedial scheme that does not take 
into account the effect of hindsight bias will likely fail to achieve its 
desired level of deterrence. Hindsight bias changes the probability that law 
 
 
 207. Id. (citations omitted). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1318. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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breaking will be punished; some valid searches that do not turn up 
evidence will be punished, deterring valid searches, while some illegal 
searches that do turn up evidence will not be punished and thus not 
deterred. Recall that under the economic conception of deterring 
lawbreaking, penalties are set at a level where the statutory penalty is an 
amount above the value to the lawbreaker, increased by the probability of 
detection and punishment. At this amount, penalties are thought to deter 
the optimal number of violations of the law. Unless the probability of 
punishment accounts for hindsight bias, the statutory penalty will not be 
set at a level that deters the optimal amount of violations of the law. Thus, 
hindsight bias only adds to the “mess” that is Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
In light of hindsight bias, the Court’s move away from a warrant 
preference to ex post reviews of reasonableness is especially troubling.214 
As the Supreme Court once acknowledged, one of the reasons for the 
warrant preference was to eliminate the taint of hindsight.215 It once even 
called ex post review a “far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event 
justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by 
the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”216 However, decisions 
that are more recent have implicitly dropped this concern.217 In the move 
toward ex post review, the Court must be assuming that a judge can 
uniformly analyze the probable cause of a search before and after that 
search has occurred. Since hindsight bias can only affect ex post review, 
the Court must be assuming that judges behave rationally and can ignore 
the effect of the bias in determining violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
While the second study by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich hinted that 
this might be true, the majority of research indicates that people are 
affected by hindsight, and more research is necessary before their findings 
can be accepted. If hindsight is a problem, the Court’s assumption of 
rational cognitive thought processes is flawed. And by favoring ex-post 
review based on this erroneous assumption of rationality, the Court has 
opened wide the door for hindsight to taint evaluations of police conduct. 
 
 
 214. Stuntz has made a similar point, see Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 64, at 915, although it is 
again unclear whether he was referring to correcting hindsight bias or a preferential bias against siding 
with criminals. See supra note 133. 
 215. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976). 
 216. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
 217. One exception is Justice Stevens’s dissent in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 570 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “inherent risks of hindsight at postseizure hearings”). 
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IV. THE BEHAVIORAL SUPPORT FOR EXCLUSION AND WARRANTS 
In light of these cognitive biases’ effect on judgment and decision 
making in the Fourth Amendment context, past and present analyses of 
current and proposed remedies are missing important considerations. By 
incorporating these biases into the analysis, this Part shows that the current 
trends are not only in error, but their reverse might better enforce the 
Fourth Amendment. 
A. Addressing Overconfidence Through Exclusion 
Because the perceived penalty of any deterrent is reduced due to 
overconfidence bias, one obvious way to counter the bias is to increase the 
penalty. As Korobkin and Ulen note, in order to overcome overconfidence, 
“penalties for . . . undesirable behavior will have to be higher than 
policymakers would otherwise think necessary to achieve the desired level 
of deterrence.”218 In the Fourth Amendment context, this could mean an 
increase in the amount of fines or an artificial increase in the amount of 
damages in constitutional torts. With the expected penalty raised, 
overconfidence would be mitigated. Yet given the pay of police officers 
and limited budgets of police departments, this proposal may be a political 
nonstarter.219 
Another method for overcoming overconfidence is increasing the 
salience of a penalty.220 Increasing the salience of a penalty may make 
people more aware of the penalty and thus more accurately assess its 
likelihood.221 When people have more information relating to the 
probability of an event or know that information is more available, they 
are better able to predict the actual probability of the event.222 Due to the 
 
 
 218. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1092. 
 219. While the general public may not be enthusiastic about excluding evidence (and thus often 
freeing criminals), I imagine they would be even less enthusiastic about significant wealth transfers 
from police officers or departments to criminals. Depending on the impact of overconfidence, these 
wealth transfers may have to be quite significant. A potentially fascinating area for future research is 
gauging public preference between freeing criminals and imposing large monetary penalties on police 
officers and departments. 
 220. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1538. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Availability is another, and perhaps more intuitive, mental shortcut. Availability refers to the 
tendency to use readily available memorable information in making such estimates: the more 
memorable an event, the greater the estimation of probability. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 
1087. On the other hand, information concerning an event might be memorable because it is, in reality, 
quite common. Id. When availability is due to commonality, the highly available information could be 
representative of the general prevalence of the event and the probability estimate could be quite 
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effect of availability of information on judgments of probability, “vivid 
and personal information will often be more effective than statistical 
evidence.”223  
One way to increase salience is to make something highly visible.224 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler give the example of using large, brightly 
colored tickets for parking violations.225 Because these tickets are highly 
visible, passing motorists recognize the potential punishment for parking 
violations. Seeing someone actually being punished increases the salience, 
and thus the availability, of information regarding punishment. Jolls, 
Sunstein and Thaler also give the example of “community policing,” 
which makes police officers highly visible to members of the 
community.226 With this information, individuals can better predict the 
probability of detection and punishment, reducing their overconfidence.227 
This increase in salience can “increase the deterrence of potential 
criminals without altering the actual probability of apprehension.”228 
In the Fourth Amendment context, a “happy feature of [the] much-
maligned [exclusionary rule] is the one that its critics always focus on: we 
can actually see the criminal walking out the courthouse door.”229 
Exclusion is a highly visible remedy, “shin[ing] a spotlight on a few of the 
robbers and drug dealers who go free.”230 The very shock of a criminal 
walking away increases the comparative availability of exclusion. This 
availability, like the brightly colored parking tickets, could mitigate the 
overconfidence bias in police. With the consequence of an illegal search so 
 
 
accurate. Id. Yet other information is memorable because it is especially salient, such as especially 
vivid or recently available information. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1519. Because the 
greater availability of this information is not due to its actual commonality, the use of available 
information will result in systematically overestimating probability. Id. at 1518. 
 For instance, extensive news coverage of a burglary, including interviews with police, witnesses, 
and experts, provides quite vivid information about that crime. When attempting to estimate the 
general likelihood of a burglary occurring, all of the information concerning that particular burglary 
will be quite memorable and, thus, quite available in memory. In contrast, one does not take notice of 
the many days where no burglaries occurred. The readily available information about the occurrence of 
a burglary would be used in estimating the abstract likelihood of that crime, while there is no equally 
available information concerning the nonoccurrence of burglary. With such a disparity in the 
availability of information, the probability of the estimate will be skewed in favor of the more 
available information, and the actual likelihood of burglary will be overestimated. 
 223. Id. at 1537. 
 224. Id. at 1538. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 443, 446 (1997). 
 230. Id. at 447. 
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visible, police can better estimate the likelihood of their own illegal search 
being detected and punished.231 
Although exclusion is not common, an event does not need to be 
common to be salient;232 the uproar exclusion can cause may be enough. 
Consider the case of Judge Harold Baer, Jr. and Carol Bayless. Bayless 
was arrested with thirty-four kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of 
heroin in the trunk of her car.233 Judge Baer, a U.S. District Judge in 
Manhattan,234 originally held that Bayless’s conduct had not given rise to 
the necessary reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop Bayless.235 Thus, all 
thirty-six kilograms of narcotics, with a street value of over four million 
dollars,236 were excluded from Bayless’s criminal trial along with her 
postarrest statements.237 
The response to this decision was furious and “an avalanche of 
criticism” followed,238 with then “President [Bill Clinton] demanding that 
[Judge Baer] resign and Congress threatening impeachment.”239 Local 
politicians, including then New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, 
publicly “assailed” Judge Baer and his decision,240 and local and national 
news outlets extensively covered the controversy.241 The pressure was so 
 
 
 231. It is unclear whether money damages would provide the same salience. If the damages or 
fines were relatively small, their visibility may be equally small. This low salience breeds 
overconfidence. Large fines that would be more visible run into the same problems of raising the fines 
solely to increase the expected punishment. 
 232. See supra note 222. 
 233. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 234. Henry J. Reske, A Duffel Bag of Controversy for Judge, ABA JOURNAL, May 1996, at 32. 
 235. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 237. In so deciding, Judge Baer had deemed the defendant’s 
testimony to be more credible than that of the arresting officer. Id. at 242. 
 236. Don Van Natta, Jr., Not Suspicious to Flee Police, Judge Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
1996, at B1 [hereinafter Van Natta, Suspicious]. 
 237. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 243. 
 238. Don Van Natta, Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Van Natta, Pressure]. 
 239. Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges—A 
Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 739 (1997). 
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Jan. 27, 1996, at 25. 
 241. Between the time that the initial decision to exclude was issued and shortly after the 
judgment was vacated, The New York Times printed over fifteen articles or editorials on the 
controversy. See Bob Herbert, Presumed to Be Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at A13; Editorial, 
Judge Baer’s Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A14; Raymond W. Kelly, Editorial, Handcuffing the 
Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at A21; Raymond W. Kelly, Editorial, Judge Baer’s Tortured 
Reasoning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1996, at A16; Krauss, supra note 240; Don Van Natta, Jr., Drug Case 
Reversal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at B3; Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Agrees to Rehear Case on Drugs 
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great that Judge Baer, even though many believed his decision was 
valid,242 vacated his decision to exclude roughly two months later.243 Some 
suspect that this reversal was motivated by political rather than legal 
reasons.244  
Even though the decision to exclude did not stand, the case of Carol 
Bayless is a prime example of the visibility of the exclusionary rule. Had 
Judge Baer originally admitted the evidence, which would undoubtedly 
have resulted in Bayless’s conviction, and only fined the offending officer, 
the media coverage likely would have been a fraction of that in the actual 
case. Exclusion, with its high visibility, can mitigate the overconfidence 
bias that affects police trying to decide whether to conduct a search. Thus, 
when we reject the assumption that police officers (or anyone else for that 
matter) are able to accurately calculate the costs and benefits of their 
conduct, and instead acknowledge that police systematically deviate from 
rational behavior, the force of exclusion becomes evident. 
B. Addressing Hindsight Through Warrants 
By moving toward a reasonableness interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has moved the legality determination of 
police conduct to an ex post review by judges. Yet, due to hindsight, these 
judges may very well be getting it wrong.245 One could very well argue 
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at 26; Don Van Natta, Jr., Prosecutors to Try Again to Sway Criticized Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
1996, at B2; Don Van Natta, Jr., Prosecutor Writes Note of Regret to Judge Baer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 1996, at B3; Van Natta, Pressure, supra note 238; Norimitsu Onishi, Judge to Be Asked to Rethink 
Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at B2. See also John M. Goshko & Nancy Reckler, 
Controversial Drug Ruling Is Reversed; N.Y. Judge Now Finds Evidence Admissible, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 1996, at A01; Editorial, A Judiciary Tainted by Politics, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), 
Apr. 4, 1996, at 16A [hereinafter Editorial, Tainted]; Judge Reverses Self, Makes Drugs Evidence, 
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Case Reverses Ruling, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 2, 1996, at A3; Editorial, The Lesson of 
Judge Baer, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A16. 
 242. See Freedman, supra note 239, at 739–40; Reske, supra note 234, at 32; Van Natta, Stand, 
supra note 241. 
 243. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 231 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 244. See Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.59 (2006); Freedman, supra note 239, at 737–43. See also Editorial, 
Tainted, supra note 241 (“Although Baer claims that the strength of new government evidence and 
inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony convinced him that he had ruled improperly the first time, 
reasonable people may conclude that the judge bowed to political pressure.”). 
 245. Although the study by Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski indicates that judges may not be 
affected by hindsight in the Fourth Amendment context, see supra notes 193–99 and accompanying 
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that a search is only reasonable if the determination of its reasonableness 
does not have the cognitive deck stacked against it.  
Eliminating any information on what the search produced can remedy 
this bias. In the context of constitutional torts against police officers, 
Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict, and Jo L. Perry have suggested 
that blinding the jury to outcome information would advantage guilty 
plaintiffs who suffer from the jury’s hindsight bias.246 Their research 
showed an increase in the number and amount of compensatory and 
punitive damages awarded to constitutional tort plaintiffs when the jury 
had no information as opposed to when a jury had information that the 
plaintiff was guilty of a crime.247 While Casper, Benedict, and Perry 
declined to say that the blind results are necessarily more accurate, they 
did note that blinding the jury at least “enable[s] jurors more effectively to 
follow the legal norm that they ignore the guilt or innocence of the suspect 
when deciding on the lawfulness of the police officer’s actions.”248 Absent 
this outcome knowledge, the cognitive shortcoming of hindsight bias has 
no chance to influence judgment. 
While Casper, Benedict, and Perry focus on jury decisions, the same 
rationale applies to judges. By keeping outcome information away from 
the judge, there is no chance for hindsight, and we can be assured that the 
judge is effectively following the legal norm. Blinding judges to outcome 
information in an ex post suppression hearing is difficult, as the only time 
one would ask for exclusion is when incriminating evidence was found. 
Thus, a judge could easily infer that incriminating evidence was found, 
even though he or she may not know what that evidence is. 
A simple yet effective way to eliminate outcome information would be 
to move the determination of reasonableness to before any outcome 
information exists, i.e., before the search. A stricter warrant preference, 
with its necessary ex ante determinations of reasonableness, would 
accomplish just that. As Stuntz has noted, “[w]arrants attack distortions 
that come with the suppression hearing by changing the timing of the 
relevant decision.”249 With a warrant procedure, the reasonableness of a 
search must be decided only on information that leads up to, and is 
supposed to justify, the search. When we abandon the rationality 
 
 
text, more research is necessary to have any reasonable belief that judges are immune. See also infra 
note 250. 
 246. Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, The Tort Remedy in Search and 
Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 279, 300 (1988). 
 247. Id. at 299. 
 248. Id. at 300. 
 249. Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 64, at 915. 
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assumption of the Court’s movement away from the warrant preference 
and acknowledge the cognitive pitfalls the movement opens up, the need 
for a strict warrant preference becomes apparent.250 
V. CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, traditional conceptions of human behavior, often culled 
from economics, do not support the maintenance of the exclusionary rule 
or the warrant preference. Yet these conceptions of behavior are 
significantly flawed. A deeper understanding of behavior reveals that these 
two movements will not attain the goal of enforcing the Fourth 
Amendment. Quite the contrary: the opposite course should be taken in 
order to ensure the amendment’s protections. 
While providing an argument for both the warrant preference and 
exclusionary rule, this Note does not pretend to have resolved the Fourth 
Amendment debate. More experimental evidence is needed before we can 
assert that the biases discussed herein are always present in the Fourth 
Amendment context. While the evidence on hindsight bias as to lay people 
is strong, more study of judges is necessary. Experiments on how 
overconfidence affects police officers are also needed.  
Further, this Note does not attempt to exhaust all of the behavioral 
phenomena that could affect the Fourth Amendment debate. For instance, 
bounded will power may also affect deterrence,251 or confirmation bias 
may affect the interpretation of seemingly corroborative evidence. Yet this 
Note provides an important step in moving toward a better understanding 
 
 
 250. It must be noted that if the indications of Guthrie, Rachlinksi, and Wistrich’s study prove to 
be accurate, judges may not be susceptible to hindsight bias in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 
See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. If this is the case, the necessity of an ex ante 
determination of reasonableness is significantly weakened.  
 If judges are not susceptible to hindsight’s influence in the Fourth Amendment context, it may be 
wise to have them decide any kind of case raising this issue. The exclusionary remedy is already 
decided by judges and thus would already benefit from this unbiased determination. This is more 
difficult with constitutional tort remedies. Presumably, constitutional tort actions would include a right 
to a jury trial. While guilty plaintiffs might quickly waive their right to a jury in order to ensure an 
unbiased determination, innocent plaintiffs would get the benefit of having their case heard by the jury, 
a decision maker that is biased toward them. Yet this shopping for decision maker due to biases is 
somewhat troubling, as innocent plaintiffs could choose to tip the cognitive scale in their favor, 
resulting in police being punished for lawful conduct. 
 251. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1538–39. 
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and application of actual judgment and decision making in the Fourth 
Amendment context. 
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